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Abstract 
This essay inquires into the possible relationship between market oriented reforms in 
Swedish housing and education policy and Malmö’s sociospatial development by 
posing the question has Malmö become a neoliberal city? If so, how? Asserting David 
Harvey and Jamie Peck’s theories, and the concepts neoliberalism, neoliberalization, 
and risk downloading, the text argues that the central state has, since the 1970s, 
gradually shifted costs and risks and surrendered steering tools to institutions at 
subordinate scales by means of decentralization, deregulation and commodification in a 
rollback/rollout dynamism. 
Meanwhile, Malmö materialized as an expanding industrial city during the 1960s and 
early 70s. However, recurring recessions, suburbanization and immigration in the 1970s 
and 80s, adressed with ineffective policy measurements, amounted to an urban crises in 
the 1990s. This spurred a reorientation in the city’s political economy, from an industrial 
city to a ’knowledge city’. In this process, Malmö – rather than addressing polarization 
and ameliorate conditions for its current population – started catering to ’an educated 
other’ by engaging in public-private partnerships and boosterism. 
The essay finds that oscillations in Swedish housing and education policy has indeed 
influenced urban development and that Malmö has, arguably, become a neoliberal city. 
Keywords: Malmö, Education, Housing, Neoliberalism, Neoliberalization, The 
Neoliberal city, Risk downloading 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The death of an ideology? 
In May, the IMF published Neoliberalism: oversold? (Ostry et al, 2016), a report which 
contained substantial critique of the said doctrine, concluding that ”[i]nstead of 
delivering growth, some neoliberal policies have increased inequality, in turn 
jeopardizing durable expansion” (2016:38). With regard to this publication, The 
Guardian proclaimed that ”[y]ou’re witnessing the death of neoliberalism – from 
within” (2016). 
This is not the first time this ideology has been declared deceased, or at least dying. 
In the aftermath of the 2008 recession, Naomi Klein, speaking at the University of 
Chicago, said that ”what we are seeing with the crash on Wall Street, I believe, should 
be for Friedmanism what the fall of the Berlin Wall was for authoritarian communism: 
an indictment of ideology” (2008). However, as documented by Jamie Peck (2012), 
neoliberalism’s creative destruction and fiscal vigilance rather intensified than waned 
in the subsequent years, through extensive and protracted austerity measurements. 
It seems, to this background, that neoliberalism’s antagonists don’t have too much 
cause for optimism and that neoliberalism, indeed, is too deeply entrenched to sustain 
any critical damage from accusations of repeated (successful) failures to generate 
socially just long-term growth (Peck, 2014). 
According to David Harvey (2005) and Peck (2010), neoliberalism’s resilience 
derives from it being more like a state of mind than a coherent ideology or system of 
governance. Formed on the ”contradictory embrace of liberty and order” (2010:39), it 
serves as a tool for reducing complexity and provides market-oriented one-size-fits-all 
solutions to decision-makers at all levels of government, perhaps most notably, cities. 
In one of his most cited works from 1989, Harvey, on the topic of post-modern urban 
development, asks ”[h]ow many successful convention centres, sports stadia, disney-
worlds, harbour places and spectacular shopping malls can there be?” (1989:12). 
Though a precise answer still eludes us, Malmö's post-industrial renaissance produces 
the impression that the local state is determined to find out. Despite being declared one 
of the poorest cities in Sweden, with staggering unemployment and dwindling school 
results (Sydsvenskan, 2016a), the city repeatedly engages in high-profile extravagant 
construction projects which, rather than ameliorate conditions for the poor, perpetuates 
the polarized urban landscape (Sydsvenskan, 2016b). 
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1.2. Malmö: a divided city 
Malmö’s development in te 20th and 21st century is a faceted topic, recorded in an 
extensive literature by numerous writers. To gain, or let alone produce, a comprehensive 
overview of earlier research within the boundaries of a bachelors essay is a daunting if 
not impossible task . The following is a brief survey of, what I believe, are works of 1
particular interest with regards to the purpose of this essay.  
A comprehensive account of Malmö’s modern development can be found in Mikael 
Stigendal and Peter Billing’s impressive PhD thesis from 1994, in which hegemonic 
social formations in Malmö during the Post-war period are scrutinized. More 
contemporary contributions have been provided by Dalia Mukhtar-Landgren (2005), 
Tove Dannestam (2009), Guy Baeten (2012) and Stigendal (2012), who’ve examined 
Malmö’s transformation from an industrial city – with emphasis on accessible blue 
collar jobs and economic convergence – to a polarized and increasingly unequal and 
socially unjust post-industrial ’knowledge city’. Potential effects of this development, 
are recorded in Tapio Salonen's (2012) and Roger Andersson, Åsa Bråmå and Jon 
Hogdal’s (2007) repports which maps increasingly apparent polarization and 
segregation patterns in Malmö, and outlines a distinct hierarchal order amongst the 
city’s neighborhoods, with Rosengård at the bottom end of the spectrum, and  Västra 
Hamnen and Bellevue on top.  On a similar note, Gunnar Blomé (2012a;b) and Per Olof 2
Hallin, Alban Jashari, Carina Listerblom and Margareta Poopola (2010), have provided 
an extensive account of living conditions and conflicts in marginalized areas of Malmö. 
The most recent contribution is Ståle Holgersen's ’compilation thesis’ from 2014. 
One of Holgersen’s main findings is that post-modern urban development in Malmö has 
taken place under a globalizing economy which is struggling with low growth rates and 
recurring recessions. To keep its head above water, the city has sought to attract capital 
and well-to-do people through vast architectural projects, austerity policies and 
reorientation towards unproductive labour,  a form of urban economic organisation 3
which, Holgersen notes, is ”surely not becoming less prone to crises” (2014:84).  4
 For a more exhaustive exposition of earlier research on Malmös development, see Holgersen, 2014a:1
13-15.
 See appendix2
 Vaguely expressed, this term refers to service jobs or ventures which are not directly involved in the 3
manufacturing of a physical product. For a more comprehensive discussion on this topic, see Holgerson, 
2014:53-56
 Holgersen’s thesis is similar both in purpose and approach to this one. I unfortunately discovered 4
Holgersen’s work when this inquiry was already far in the making. Therefore I have not been able to 
situate this text in relation to his findings in a satisfactory manner. Whereas Holgersen’s work is 
undoubtably greater in extent, exactitude, and insight, my comparatively modest contribution puts more 
emphasis on neoliberalism, national policy and education.
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1.3. Neoliberalism in Sweden 
Developments in Malmö have been paralleled by a wave of prevailing neoliberalism in 
Swedish policy and public management, at national as well as subordinate scales. 
Substantial reforms in central welfare services and increasing economic divergence 
(Blomqvist, 2004) has amounted to a reorientation of Swedish society, from a virtually 
entirely publicly managed system founded on redistributive socialism, to a proliferating 
embrace of neoliberal theory and practice, sometimes voluntarily, other times in 
response to coercive pressures (Harvey, 2005:112-115).  
According to Sven-Eric Liedman (2011), neoliberalism has prevailed in the Swedish 
education system, which, in practice, has become a mechanism that sifts winners from 
losers in a increasingly unequal political economy. On a similar note, Liedman, 
Stigendal (2012), Skolverket (2009) and Bunar Nihad (2010; 2012) concludes that class 
and (in particular) ethnicity have become increasingly influential over pupils’ prospects, 
as segregation and decreasing equivalence prevails.  5
In terms of housing, Karin Hedin, Eric Clark, Emma Lundholm and Gunnar 
Malmberg (2010) has documented increasing economic polarization in Sweden since 
the 1990s. They argue that this development is, to great extent, directly related to policy 
decisions which has transformed the housing market from a cornerstone in the welfare 
state, to a tool for political pacification, economic divergence and accumulation thru 
dispossession (Harvey, 2004). This is also recognized by Ingrid Sahlin (2013) and 
Håkan Forsell (2013). 
1.4. Purpose and research question 
To this background, the immediate purpose of this essay is to investigate a possible 
relationship between the above mentioned developments in the Swedish housing policy, 
Swedish education policy and the city of Malmö. In doing so, I hope to be able to 
outline some important factors or mechanisms that has shaped the city and its 
inhabitants. To this purpose, the material will be conceptualized in terms of 
neoliberalism, neoliberalization, risk downloading and the neoliberal city.  6
I should add, for the sake of transparency, that the use of these concepts in academics 
is limited chiefly to critical social theory (Peck, 2010:3). I personally adhere to this 
school in so far that I concur with Havery’s (2008) analysis that a right to the city ought 
to be a political ideal as it highlights the forces that controls the necessary relationship 
between urbanization and the production and realisation of surpluses, and that, 
accordingly, the global and local struggles for space is a form of class struggle in which 
 Equivalence, in this context, refers to equal access to, and quality and compensatory ability of education 5
(Skolverket, 2012:11-13).
 These concepts are explained below.6
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the most marginalized groups have been dispossessed of their rights under processes of 
global accumulation. Therefore, the secondary or underlying purpose of this essay is to 
”chart the path from an urbanism based on exploitation to an urbanism appropriate for 
human species” (Harvey, 1973: 314). 
1.4.1. Why Malmö? 
Post-industrial city transitions similar to that of Malmö’s have occurred across the 
developed capitalist economies. However, the case of Malmö stands out on four points. 
Firstly, the immense swiftness of the metamorphosis is quite unmatched (Holgersen, 
2014a). Secondly, this transformation has taken place under socio-democratic rule 
(Holgersen, 2014b). Thirdly, Malmö’s development has been carefully narrated as a 
success-story, featuring the head of the municipality, Illmar Reeplau, as ’the strong man’ 
which brought the city back to life after the unmerciful recession. As argued by 
Mukhtar-Landgren (2005), Dannestam (2009) and Holgersson (2014), this process has 
not necessarily been in the best interest of all inhabitants, and therefore deserves some 
scrutiny. Fourthly, from an urban development perspective, Malmö’s limited 
geographical sprawl makes the city something of a deviant case in a Swedish context. In 
Stockholm (Andersson & Magnusson Turner, 2014) and Gothenburg (Andersson et al. 
2009), absolute distance is considered a driving factor in the cities’ respective 
sociospatial formation. In the geographically condense Malmö, this element would 
arguably not impact spatial hierarchies and economic polarization to the same extent, 
which makes the city interesting for examining social relations. 
1.4.2. Why housing and education policy? 
Many sectors of Swedish welfare have developed on similar lines as housing and 
education (Blomqvist, 2004). Though all redistributive policy fields probably influence 
urban evolution, ambit forces selectivity. As housing and education, arguably, have a 
more direct impact on sociospatial formations than other welfare sectors, I’ve chosen 
these subdivisions for inquiry.  
Where we live does not only predicate our movements, it also affects our liability to 
get a job, our economic situation and the like (Andersson et al. 2007). On a more 
abstract level, real-estate, or more precisely the buying and selling of land, is, according 
to Lefebvre (1991), a major factor in the production of space; physical as well as 
institutional and social development.  7
Schools are not only vital for social integration (Bunar, 2012), they also impact 
migration patterns (Andersson, 2001) and have been noted to directly influence house 
prices (Sydsvenskan, 2010). 
 For a more elaborative discussion on this topic, see Nyström, 2013; Berg et al. 2013; Forsell, 2013.7
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1.4.3. Research question 
To this background, my research question is: 
· Has Malmö become a neoliberal city? If so, how? 
For clarity and structure, I also pose two sub-questions: 
· Have there been tendencies of neoliberalization in the development of Swedish 
housing and education policy? 
· Has the relationship between the Swedish central state and Malmö city displayed 
tendencies of risk downloading? 
1.4.4. Temporal delimitation and material 
An inquiry of this multi-scalar and paradigmatic nature must cover the historically 
specific political and sociospatial landscapes both prior to, under and after the initial 
ascent of neoliberal incursions, corresponding resistance and subsequent 
transformations (cf. Peck et al 2009:51-54). With regard to the mentioned developments 
in national policy and Malmö, this essay mainly concerns itself with the time-period 
between 1940 and 2012. 
Due to the extensive scope and historical nature of the inquiry, and the rich material 
available on Malmö’s development, I’ve decided to rely on existing literature for 
empirical evidence. My chief sources are Government inquiries (SOU, Statens 
offentliga utredningar), reports from the national housing bureau (Boverket) and the 
national education bureau (Skolverket) and works from critical social scientists. Apart 
from those mentioned in the background, Fronesis nr. 18 (2005) and nr. 42-43 (2013) 
has served as a source for both information and inspiration. 
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2. Theory 
2.1. Framing neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is first and foremost an ideology centered around an economic notion of 
individual liberty, responsibility and competition that draws on a conception of society 
as a market, and the individual as a consumer. Accordingly, the right to property and 
free trade are considered means to promote individual freedom and desirable societal 
development. Preferably, the state should be as minimalistic as possible, chiefly 
concerned with creating and upholding markets and facilitating trade by maintaining 
personal safety, guaranteeing the integrity of money and protecting property. Enforced 
by law and order, ’market logic’ will prevail, making human endeavors subject to 
competition and the rule of supply and demand. Under such conditions, flows of capital 
will organize society rationally and spur ventures that will serve as the impetus of 
innovation and growth. The wealth generated becomes a rising tide that lifts all boats, 
by trickling down to less fortunate places and members of society (Harvey, 2005:2-3).  
This doctrine emerged as a fusion between the Mont Pelirin Society and Chicago 
School’s free market-theorists who, during the 20th century, collaborated to develop 
(and implement) a new market liberal ideology, as an alternative to Keynesianism 
(Peck, 2010; Harvey, 2005).  
However, according to Peck (2010), neoliberalism’s pristine free-market utopia, 
being predicated on economic theory rather than real world conditions, can never be 
fully realized. It exists merely in mongrelized forms, preying on preexisting political 
institutions and social formations for its survival, constantly mutating into new impure 
configurations. This dynamism favors a conception of neoliberalism as a process of 
neoliberalization; a ”mobilization of state power in the contradictory extension and 
reproduction of market(-like) rule” (Tickell & Peck, 2003: 167), rather than a concrete 
institutional outcome. As such, neoliberalization is – in practice – more of a 
proliferative strategy, ’pragmatic approach’ or state-of-mind. 
2.2. Framing neoliberalization 
Though neoliberalization has few common denominators, Peck argues that a 
preliminary distinction can be made between ”the ’roll–back’ and ’roll-out’ faces of 
neoliberalism” (2010:22). Roll-back processes are usually predominant in 
neoliberalization’s initial onslaught, when restructuring maneuvers typically targets 
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Keynesian-welfarist institutions, deregulating fields formerly under bureaucratic 
influence and ”disciplining potentially unruly (collective) subjects” (2010:22). By 
means of budget cuts, organizational downsizing and privatization, public bureaucracies 
and planning agencies are forced to surrender steering tools and revenue streams, 
oftentimes in the name of decentralisation and democratization. 
In place of the institutions they undermine, neoliberal projects usually relies on 
”spontaneously organizing social and market forces” (2010:22), a formula which, quite 
rapidly, tends to encounter predictable limits. Responses to these problems embeds the 
contextually specific reconstructive measurements within each neoliberalizing social 
formation which, in turn,  amounts to long lasting and extensive changes across the 
political and organizational landscape. Therefore, each case of neoliberalization is ”very 
much defined by the particular terrains of struggle that free-market reformers confront 
’domestically’” (2010:22). 
As, in due time, the negative consequences of austerity measurements, deregulatory 
overreach and social abandonment become pressing, the (local) state is forced to 
intervene, inducing a ”protracted phase of roll-out neoliberalism” (2010:23). Predicated, 
to great extent, on the contradictions of the preceding roll-back, the roll-out movement 
typically involves an ”explosion of ’market conforming’ regulatory 
incursion” (2010:23) which consolidate neoliberalized modes of governance and state 
forms. These ’second wave’ roll-out interventions are, like their preceding counterparts, 
proliferative and variegated. However, some recurring elements in the roll-out repertoire 
are public-private partnerships and selective empowerment of non governmental 
organizations as a flexible low-cost alternative to public service providers. 
Institutionally, these actions are usually entwined with devolved governance and new 
public management.  8
Together, series of neoliberal failures and succeeding neoliberal adaptions  tends to 
foster a ’forward failing’ dynamism, inducing right-leaning ’third way’ politics; a 
combination of social interventionism and deference to financial globalization. 
In essence, the fragmenting effect of proliferating neoliberalization can be 
understood in terms of risk downloading (Peck, 2014). This refers to a process in which 
public actors ’download’ risks or costs to subordinate scales by means of 
decentralization, cutbacks in social service or deregulation. This, in a way, favors local 
decision-making and place-specific ventures. However, absence of a redistributive and 
regulating leviathan also induces cities into a state of interurban competition for 
international capital (cf. Harvey, 1989; Smith, 2003). Under these conditions, local 
institutions are in turn prone to download risk onto individual organisations and people, 
differently equipped to interact under conditions of prevailing market-order 
restructuring. 
 These concepts are more closely defined below8
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2.3. Framing the neoliberal city 
In accordance with neoliberalization’s downward oscillation, the neoliberal city can be 
perceived as a ”site of serial policy failure as well as resistance to neoliberal programs 
for urban restructuring” (Peck et al. 2009:1), which’s development follows the pattern 
of partial roll-back and tendential roll-out moments.  
The latter, though contextually variegated, is according to Peck (2014:1) entwined 
with a notion of the city as a commodity or product which must be sold and marketed. 
Accordingly, the urban landscape is shaped so to accommodate and appeal to global 
capital. In the developed economies, this typically involves strategies and land-use 
regimes which strives to create and communicate a good ’business-climate’ for 
enterprises or entrepreneurs. However, those who do not have the means to indulge in 
the spoils of these industrious havens have little to gain from such developments, except 
for the occasional ’ticket to the circus’  (Peck, 2005;2010: 220-225).  
We will return this topic shortly. But first, there are some conceptual issues that 
deserves scrutiny. 
2.3.1. A sociospatial approach 
The notion of a ’neoliberal city’ could imply that cities, or spaces in general, can pose as 
active agents. This is however not the notion I intend to convey. Rather, neoliberal 
urbanism should be regarded as ”a spatially grounded process in which a wide range of 
different actors with quite different objectives and agendas interact trough a particular 
configuration of interlocking spatial practices” (Harvey, 1989:5).  
These interlocking spatial practices produce space by continuously creating built 
environments and institutional arrangements which contains human life and predicates 
subsequent actions. Further, space is also the environment of experience out of which 
symbolic readings and desires emerge. As such, it influences the inhabitants’ 
consciousness (cf. Harvey, 1989:6). 
Therefor, the ’neoliberal city’ should arguably be understood as a produced space 
which imposes certain premisses on its inhabitants who, in turn, reproduces it. In 
relation to neoliberalization at superordinate scales, this means that the neoliberal city, 
or neoliberal urbanism, has a reciprocal relationship with risk downloading and 
interurban competition; it is shaped by these mechanisms while simultaneously 
reproducing an developing them and, in turn, itself. Accordingly, the neoliberal city is 
both process and form, structure and object, activity and thing (cf. Harvey, 1989:6). 
Essentially dynamic, analyses of this phenomena should ”properly focus on change – 
on systems and logics, dominant patterns of restructuring and so forth – rather than on 
binary and/or static comparisons between a past state and its erstwhile successor” (Peck 
& Tickell, 2003). Such an inquiry favors a conceptual apparatus that is porous and 
open-ended. Duly, the following outlines common denominators in neoliberal discourse 
and urban development.  
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2.3.2. Public–private partnerships 
Public–private partnership is in many ways the embodiment of neoliberal urbanism. It 
refers to projects in which ”traditional local boosterism is integrated with the use of 
local governmental powers to try and attract external sources of funding, new direct 
investments, or new employment sources” (Harvey, 1989:7). Public-private partnerships 
are usually speculative and oftentimes designed so that the public sector assumes the 
risk while the private sector reaps the benefits. 
These projects tend to emphasize ”the political economy of place rather than 
territory” (1989:7). The latter refers to investments that are designed primarily to 
ameliorate living or working conditions within a specific jurisdiction, whereas 
development of place is more similar to branding. It typically involves corporate-
friendly policies or construction of entertainment and office centers, projects which are 
supposed to benefit image, rather than substance; ”their form is such as to make all 
benefits indirect and potentially either wider or smaller in scope than the jurisdiction 
within which they lie” (1989:8).  
With specific regards to the built environment, such schemes induces a 
neoliberalization of urban planning practices, in which coherent, long-term, end-state 
planning is disrupted and replaced with mid- or short-term projects. This organizational 
restructuring is usually precipitated by a more ambivalent or ambiguous position of 
planning institutions (as the distinction between private and public interests is vague in 
the logic of neoliberal ubranism) and an increasingly opportunity-led approach to urban 
planning. In practice, these elements tends to contribute to fragmented and property-led 
forms of urban evolution, in which planning is used as a tool to ”introduce changes 
without formulating an overall policy to regulate new development” (Tasan-Kok, 
2012:11). In this regard, neoliberal urbanism both produces and exploits sociospatial 
differences. As such, uneven development represents a ”coevolving and codependent 
facet of the neoliberalization process itself” (Peck et al. 2009:53). 
2.3.3. Trickle down economics 
Neoliberal urbanism in general, and public private partnerships in specific, tends to rely 
on a notion of trickle down as a redistribution tool and source for legitimacy, basically 
justifying all kinds of economic growth and competition. This discourse enforces 
center–periphery relations, as it creates a hierarchal order between ’nourishing’ and 
’consuming’ subjects in the economy. The elite-focused strategies for urban 
development, typically targeting companies, white-collar or no-collar workers and 
property owners, leaves the remaining many with supporting or subordinate roles in the 
progressing economy. They are dependent on the (tentative) benefits that come trickling 
down, either spontaneously or via selective welfare systems and social interventions, 
often conditioned in accordance with workfarist logic (Peck, 2010:220-225). 
!9
2.3.4. New public management 
Institutionally, neoliberal urbanism typically coevolves with new-public management, 
as a means to reduce cost and increase efficiency of public services and administration 
by outsourcing property and ventures to private contractors.  
Consequentially, the local state surrender revenue streams and become increasingly 
dependent on private actors to be able to supply social services (Peck, 2012; 2014). 
Further, quality-assurance of outsourced services promotes ’management by audit’ 
which, in nature, is quantitive and binary. Though sometimes successful, these methods 
have a tendency to reduce complex and faceted processes, like education, to univocal 
and ill-responding attributes, like competence (Liedman, 2011:60-75; Stigendal 
2012:51-52) 
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3. Swedish education policy 
During the post-war period, school policy in Sweden considered education an essential 
tool to promote equality and overcoming social boundaries (Wiborg, 2010:8). This 
notion of education originated from an idea that schools should accelerate development 
by providing the young with tools to build a better society; a forge for utopias 
(Liedman, 2011:15-16). A government inquiry, published in 1948, clearly states that the 
school system should have extensive democratic ambitions and strive to foster “free and 
independent human beings, to whom cooperation is both a requisite and pleasure [my 
translation]” (SOU, 1948:4). This development was to progress at equal pace across the 
country, with careful consideration to provide gifted students with the possibility to 
realize their potential without impoverishing the working class of theoretical faculty and 
engendering a divided society (SOU, 1948:9). 
Centralization was instrumental in the realisation of these values on a national scale. 
Schools were managed through a nationwide curriculum and syllabus, and funds were 
provided by the central state (Lundahl, 2002:687-688; SOU, 1948:9). Pupils were 
distributed among schools via a system of attendance zones, which provided public 
institutions with ample opportunity to model the education system in accordance with 
political values (Lundahl, 2002:688-689). 
3.1. 1970-90: decentralization and ’quasi-markets’ 
In shadow of recurring economic recessions and unemployment issues, the education 
system was widely perceived as too bureaucratic (SOU, 1973:52-55, 201). Accordingly, 
lesser measurements towards decentralisation were taken during the course of the 1970s 
and early 1980s (Lundahl, 2002:690). 
Kjell-Ove Feldt, minster of finance 1982–1990, induced reorientation towards ’quasi 
markets’ in the social service sector.  It was argued that, by relieving management of 9
direct political control – reducing the role of government to that of purchasing services 
on behalf of the public from competing providers on contract basis – productivity in the 
service sector would increase (Blomqvist, 2004:145).  
Accordingly, in 1988, a reform was introduced trough which regulatory powers were 
transferred to municipalities and to the schools themselves from the central state 
(Wiborg, 2010:8-9). Although the schools were still to some extent financed by national 
 Virtually every publication from the ministry of finance under Feldt’s time in office advocated ’quasi 9
markets’ (Blomqvist, 2004). 
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governments, a larger part of the fiscal responsibility of education was put on 
municipalities in this reform (Bunar, 2010:6-7; Wiborg, 2010:8). 
3.2. 1990s: the choice revolution 
In 1992, under conservative rule, the ’quasi market’ reorientation was enforced by the 
implementation of ’free choice’ and a voucher system (skolpeng). Free choice ment that 
pupils and parents could choose schools according to their preferences (Lundahl, 
2002:691-692). The skolpeng-grant, resembling the Danish so-called ’taximeter’ system 
(Wiborg, 2010:9),  corresponded to the average pupil cost in public schools (Blomqvist, 
2004:147-148), and consequently established conditions under which public and free 
schools competed on equal terms. 
These reforms brought about a favorable climate for non-public schools, which 
multiplied with dispatch.  This group of education providers – who until 2000 were 10
allowed to charge tuition fees and impose special rules on admissions – were, and still 
are, overrepresented in high-income areas of larger cities (Wiborg, 2010:9-13). 
As a result of the growing number of non-public schools and ideological zeitgeist, 
central state’s influence over curriculum and syllabus was reduced in favor of local 
teachers and headmasters. Further, in accordance with the decentralisation agenda, 
school funds from central government were payed in lump sums to municipalities after 
1993 (Wiborg, 2010:9-10). Thus, the Swedish schools system had been transformed 
from a public system under bureaucratic control, with limited pupil and parental 
options, to one of the world’s most liberal education systems (Blomqvist, 2004:148). 
3.2.1. ”The right to free choice”  11
These reforms coevolved with a discourse which emphasized household responsibility 
and customer-orientation by means of competition. In the proposition which preceded 
the 1993 reform, Beatrice Ask, minister of education, argued that free choice and 
decentralization would render parents and pupils more influential over matters 
regarding design and organisation of schools, which, in turn, would spur cost-reducing 
and educational innovations (proposition, 1992/93:27). Similarly, Ask also stressed the 
importance of closer collaboration between schools and the local labour market, as 
demands for up-to-date competence increased (Regeringen, 1992/93:29-35). 
 Between 1991 and 2010, the number of free schools in Sweden went from 70 to 709 (Wiborg, 10
2010:10). 
 From proposition, 1992/93:27, my translation11
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3.2.2. Quality assurance and criterion-referenced grades 
Decentralisation was paralleled by a simultaneous development of quality assurance 
policys. In the 1980s, quantitative evaluation methods developed within the field of 
business management gradually spread to the education system. From 1997, schools 
were obliged to deliver written reports on educational results, which increased teachers 
total workload and reduced their effective time teaching (SOU, 2014:186-188). This 
reform has also been criticized for promoting ’obedience to the system’ and ’window 
dressing’, rather than responsible behavior from principals (SOU, 2014:322-325).  
In line with the quantitative approach to education, a criterion-referenced grade 
system  was introduced in 1998, so to motivate students and facilitate performance 12
management (SOU, 2007:12). However, implementation of this system proved to be 
difficult. The learning objectives were characterized by inexactitude and equivocality, 
and the grading-process was arbitrary and variegated (SOU, 2007; Ekecrantz, 2007). 
3.3. Cooping with competition 
Sterner competition between education providers – public as well as private – spurred 
organizational restructuring in schools, which, across the board, became more market-
oriented. To attract the increasingly volatile pupil base, teachers and headmasters 
became involved in market schemes and ’educational profiling’. Further, information 
management developed, so that schools could convey their educational ’vision’ and 
’mission’ in a toughening market (Skolverket 2003; 2006a). 
During the course of the 1990s, schools experienced social and economic 
polarisation which, in turn, resulted in a decreased equivalence (Skolverket, 2003). 
Similarly, results between school-classes, pupil groups and schools diverged 
(Skolverket, 2012:33-45; Malmberg, et. al. 2013). Further, so-called school level-
effects  became increasingly important factors in a successful schooling (Skolverket, 13
2009; 2012; Bunar, 2010:9-10; Gustafson, 2006:16-17). In practice, this means that the 
choice of school have become increasingly important for a pupil’s education, grades and 
social network (cf. Malmberg et. al., 2013; Bunar, 2010; Skolverket, 2003). 
 Earlier, the grade system was relative which, in practice, meant that a student was entitled to a grade as 12
long as she participated in the education.  
 School level effects (skolnivåeffekter) refers to the impact a school’s socio-economic composition has 13
on pupil performances (Skolverket, 2012:71).
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3.4. Analysis 
Developments in Swedish education policy display a clear tendency of 
neoliberalization. The initial de-centralization, followed by gradual market-conforming 
measurements (free-choice, flat-rate system and eventually a quantified evaluation- and 
grading system), parallelled with an increasing reliance of competition in general, and 
free schools in specific, to generate cost-reducing and education-enhancing progress, is 
all very much in line with neoliberalism’s tentative approach to development. The 
discursive shift of emphasis from equality  (1940s) to customer-orientation (1990s) via 
cost-reduction (1970s-80s) adds to the weight of evidence and, possibly, highlights 
neoliebrlaism’s ’cutting’ progression. 
Further, increasing municipal-, household- and pupil responsibility, combined with 
growing workloads for teachers and diverging equivalence, gives witness to 
neoliberalism’s contradictory and risk-shifting rationality.  
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4. Swedish housing policy 
Similar to that of education, the 1940s saw Sweden develop and conduct an active 
housing policy with distinguished social ambitions. The housing market  was 14
considered a cornerstone in the construction of a functioning welfare state. Partly in 
terms of providing satisfying living conditions for a growing middle class in urban as 
well as rural areas, but also as a foundation for constructing a social economy 
(Boverket, 2007:11-12, 49-79; SOU, 1945; 1947). Substandard housing was effectively 
replaced new dwellings under fiscal and regulatory interference from central state. 
Meanwhile, substantial subsidies and grants made the new apartments affordable for 
less affluent households (Boverket, 2007:11; Hedin et al 2011:446). The social housing 
inquiry (bostadssociala utredningen) assigned in 1932, found that it was preferable to 
restrict speculation and involvement of private actors in state-led housing projects. This 
way, the housing sector would be resilient to economic crises and free to conduct a 
rational build-up of the housing stock without particular interests interfering. Instead of 
private actors, municipality owned non-profit housing companies was assigned to 
develop, maintain and distribute housing, financed by favorable loans and direct 
investments from the central state (SOU:1945:499-502,547; Proposition 1946; 
Boverket, 2007:11). 
4.1. 1960-1980: industrialization and redistribution 
The 1965 inquiry on housing construction (bostadsbyggnadsutredningen) established 
that the Swedish housing stock had been substantially enhanced, and that living 
conditions had improved severely (SOU, 1965:34-35). Now however, urbanization 
demanded measurements addressing cramped housing, physical deterioration and slums 
in cities (Boverket, 2007:55-56; SOU, 1965:514). 
4.1.1 ’Miljonprogrammet’ 
A goal was set to produce one million homes during the course of a ten year period, 
with the expressed ambition to “supply the entire population with modern, spacious, 
 For a listing of the different tenancy forms in the Swedish housing market, see (Blomé, 2012a:95).14
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planned and appropriately equipped housing at affordable costs [my 
translation]” (proposition 1967, cited by boverket, 2007:56). This ambitious project was 
referred to as miljonprogrammet. Accordingly, the housing construction process was 
streamlined and industrialized through long-term government loans, increased local 
planning capacity and deregulation of rent control. (Boverket, 2007:56-57, 68, 73). In 
this decentralisation process, planers and architects became more influential in housing 
development projects to the detriment of transparency and democratic legitimacy 
(Sundström, 1994:58-60; Larsson & Jalakas, 2012:50-55) 
4.1.2. Tenure neutrality 
As a result of the government’s policy to keep rent-levels equal across the country and 
stimulate housing construction and consumption, home ownership had become a 
comparatively favorable tenure form (Boverket, 2007:81). To this background, the first 
half of the 1970s saw a shift of emphasis in Swedish housing policy from dealing with 
cramped housing and increasing living standards towards tenure neutrality.  15
4.2. The 1980s: from housing to labour policy 
During the later half of the 1970s, the political spectrum in Sweden changed 
considerably. Economic recession and the energy crisis caused substantial turmoil, and 
radicalized the parties ideological standpoints. Faced with the prospect of a negative 
budget scenario that stretched far into the future, advocates of austerity measurements 
grew in numbers and influence (Sundström, 1994:172-174). 
4.2.1. The ROT-program 
Under these conditions, policy makers strived to develop a sonderweg between 
capitalism and socialism with more emphasis on trade and industry than earlier in 
Swedish policy. This new direction manifested itself in the ROT-program implemented 
in 1983. Through extensive subsidies, property owners would be incentivized to invest 
in the built environment which would benefit both development and employment at the 
same time. (Boveket, 2007:79, 90-91; Sundström, 1994:231-233; Hedin et al. 
2010:444).  
 Tenure neutrality refers to equal housing costs for similar dwellings, regardless of tenure form (SOU, 15
1975:50-51).
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4.3.2. Decentralization 
With similar motive, the plan- and building act  was reformed, de-centralising 16
responsibility and policy instruments for housing construction and planning (BoU, 
1986/87:16). In practice, the changes meant that the parties directly involved in a 
planning- or renewal project (i.e. the municipality, consumers and constructors) were 
given almost unscrutinized control over the planning process (Boverket, 85-87; 
Nyström, 2013:189:190). This created conditions under which the building sector 
thrived and could expand rapidly, both in terms of turnover and influence  (Sundström, 17
1994:231). 
4.3. 1990-2010: Housing – a commodity among others 
Financial hardships and staggering inflation in the late 1980s set the stage for a new 
direction in Swedish housing policy during the 1990s. Regulations was perceived as the 
impetus of increasing housing costs and reduced construction output, and the state’s 
rising expenses on account of the active housing policy was deemed untenable in the 
inflation-economy of the time (Boverket, 2007:99-100). 
Under Carl Bildt’s conservative government, the housing sector became subject to 
general economic policy, rather than protected from it as it had been before. It was 
argued that 
a prerequisite for universal access to suitable accommodation at a reasonable price, is that 
the general economic policy is successful. It is of particular importance that inflation is 
countermanded and that state expenses are decreased, promoting conditions for lower rent, 
tax-cuts and economic growth [my translation](SOU, 1992:47:9). 
4.3.1. Closing the housing department 
In 1991, the housing department was closed after substantial critique from the 
conservative government and the building sector. 
The housing department’s officials wanted to develop their ventures in direction 
towards social problems in the built environment, whereas the protagonists advocated a 
research agenda which would more directly result in lower building costs and increase 
the building sectors international competitiveness (Sundström, 1994:182-185, 201-203, 
233-237). 
 The plan- and building act (plan- och bygglagen) regulates and enforces society’s interests in the built 16
environment.
 In 1988, the construction industry occupied 300 000 workers, equivalent to 15 percent of the total 17
national employment (Sundström, 1994:231).
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4.3.2 Social Housing 
The same year, changes were once again made to the plan- and building act which 
diminished centralized influence over municipalities. Regulation enforcing housing 
provision and -assignment were abolished.  So was the land criterion (markvillkoret), 18
which had strengthened municipalities to control construction companies. These policy 
instruments were regarded as unnecessary interferences, both in the municipal 
autonomy and the free market order (SOU, 1999:148; Boverket, 2007:28). 
Also in line with the commodification agenda, housing benefits based on income and 
family size – directed at the most marginalized households – were severely reduced 
(Clark, 2013:155). However, the home mortgage interest deduction remained.  Further, 
the tenancy act (hyresrättslagen) was reformed in favor of the landlords, only a 
marginally reformed use-value system (bruksvärdesystemet) which controlled rent-
levels remained (Sahlin, 2013:56). 
4.3.3. ’Danell-systemet’ 
In 1993, the so-called ’Danell-system’ was introduced. The housing-loan system was 
changed to a credit guarantee system which was abolished a year later. Further, 
subsidies to housing construction were severely reduced or discontinued. In practice, 
the state abandoned its fiscal responsibility, making the housing sector subject to 
interest rates and investor’s demands on return. Consequently, fiscal aspects of the 
housing sector became more difficult to control politically. In effect, risk was shifted 
from the state onto other stakeholders (Boverket, 2007:29; SOU, 2000:127-128; 
1999:29-31, 37-39). 
4.3.4. ”Many goals, few means”  19
The market-liberal reorientation continued practically unopposed during the later half of 
the 1990s, and was entrenched under social democratic rule from 1994 (Sahlin:
2013:56). Some housing and construction subsidies were reintroduced, but these were 
selective in character, rather than general as they had been before (Boverket, 
2007:28-29). Furhter, in 1997, Göran Person’s government drastically reduced housing 
benefits (Sahlin, 2013:56). Overall, this period was characterized by increasing 
awareness of the limits of market-rationalization pared with poor readiness and lacking 
means (Boverket, 2007:28). Rather than housing policy, the political discourse at the 
 The housing provision- and housing assignment act (bostadsförsörjningslagen and 18
bostadsförmedlingslagen) supported inhabitants right to sound living environments and obliged 
municipalities to plan according to the the housing needs of its population (SOU, 1999:148).
 The title of Boverkets inquiry on public support to housing construction 1993-2004 (2005), my 19
translation
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time mostly concerned the EU entrance in 1995, and how to adapt to the supranational 
order (Hedin et al., 2010:445). 
4.3.5. Commodification continued 
In 2006, the conservative party (campaigning as ’the new labour party’) under 
leadership of Fredrik Reinfeldt, came into power. Two years later, the objective of 
Swedish housing policy was changed, explicitly enforcing market-relations. 
The goal for housing is long-term well-functioning housing markets where consumer 
demand meets a supply of housing which corresponds to their needs (proposition, 
2007/08:1:15 cited in Hedin et al. 2010:458). 
The same year also saw changes in property taxation which was transformed from being 
a progressive national tax to a regressive municipal tax. This development benefited 
property owners, especially those with extravagant homes. With similar effect, a 
subsidy for purchasing household services (RUT-avdraget) was implemented in 2007. 
The following year, the ROT-program was enforced and a credit guarantee for first-time 
buyers who otherwise would not have been able to purchase dwellings was introduced 
(Finansdepartementet, 2007; Hedin et al., 2010:458). 
4.4. Conditions of residential capitalism 
The political economy established in the 1990s entailed substantial motives to buy and 
invest in real-estate. As social protection devolved, taxation decreased and subsidies 
towards property-ownership and renovation projects were introduced, the notion of 
’home’ became central in a societal development which, compared to the 1960s and 
earlier, was more centered around protection, security and safeguarding of social 
privileges (Forsell, 2013:206).  
4.4.1. Discontinued tenure neutrality  
Between 1986 and 2005 rents increased by 122 percent, whereas living costs in owner 
occupancy increased only by 41 percent, and the general inflation by 49 percent. The 
rapid increase of rents were closely related to policy; chiefly reduced subsidies and 
increased taxation on rental accommodation. Consequently, between 1986 and 2003, 
low-income earners and households dwelling in rental housing spent increased shares of 
their disposable income on housing than those living in other tenure forms. (Hedin et 
al., 2010:445-446; Sahlin, 2013:56). 
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4.4.2. ”Three housing markets in regional turbulence”  20
De-regulation had left municipalities with a very limited range of effective political 
steering tools to regulate land prices, which gradually came under market control. This 
allowed vast sums of capital to accumulated in expensive neighborhoods, as costly plots 
incentivized housing companies to develop extravagant dwellings which would yield 
lofty revenues. Apart from contributing to towering land prices and building costs, this 
development contributed to segmentation  as rental apartments were precluded in 21
expensive areas on basis of return on investment (SOU, 2000:127). Meanwhile, areas 
with a less well-to-do population were struggling with vacancies, fiscal austerity, and a 
tapering rate of construction and renewal projects (Boverket, 2007:113-115; SOU, 
2000:127-128; 1999:35-39). 
4.4.3. Privatization of public housing 
Discontinued subsidies and rising prices resulted in a lowered effective demand. In 
combination with the de-regulated credit market and introduction of a flat rate-system, 
this caused severe problems for public housing companies  which after 1993, competed 22
on equal terms with private actors (Andersson et al., 2010:247; SOU, 1999:29-31, 
37-39; Enström Öst, 2013). The situation contributed to a widespread privatization of 
public housing companies and -dwellings, as municipalities – largely abandoned by 
central state  – were left to prioritize between housing provision and other services 23
(SOU, 1992:17-19). 
4.4.4. Economic polarization and poor living conditions 
Reduced subsidies and privatization of public housing has, although varying in form, 
increased polarisation of social groups (Enström & Öst, 2013). Private landlords have 
been noted to systematically put higher demands on tenant’s social status and economy 
– a tendency which seems to have spread to public actors as well (Sahlin, 2008; Blomé, 
2012a:102) – leaving a substantial group of marginalized people who does not have 
priority to public housing via the municipalities social service, nor have the economic 
ability to buy housing or take loans. This is reflected in the increasing occurrence of 
 Housing sector development described in State inquiry (1999:41), my translation.20
 Segmentation refers to spatial separation of tenure forms. i.e. when rental dwellings are clustered, 21
hindering social mixing.
 Public housing companies (allmännyttan) grants housing for all social classes. The group consists of 22
local ’business limited liability companies’ and some foundations.
 Regulation on privatization was implemented in 1999, enforced in 2002 but abolished in 2007 (Blome, 23
2012:96) 
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homelessness and cramped housing, which has spiralled since the 1990s (Hedin et al., 
2010:459). 
Overall, reforms in the 1990s and 2000s amounted to a commodified housing market 
which went from being a state expense of 30 billion in 1990, to a net income of 31 
billion Swedish crowns per year in 1999 (SOU, 1999:148:33-34). Paralleled with 
taxation reforms, economic restructuring policy and rising unemployment, the 
restructured housing sector contributed to rapidly increasing economic divergence and 
polarisation across the country.  24
4.5 Analysis 
Developments in Swedish housing policy suggests a clear process of neoliberalization. 
The discursive shift from explicit emphasis on solidarity and affordable housing to 
complete commodification and consumer-orientation, is perhaps the most conspicuous 
transformation. But it’s stiff competition. 
The termination of the housing department, discontinuation of subsidies, loans, credit 
guarantee, and grants, and the deregulation of housing provision displays substantial 
devaluation of ’soft’ values and an almost blind faith to market rationality. Further – 
with regard to the subsequent polarization, reduced effective demand and construction, 
and uneven development, followed by direct support to home-owners and the 
construction industry (in terms of grants and deregulation) – this also highlights the 
contradictory relationship between neoliberal theory and practice, as well as the roll-
back/roll-out dynamism of neoliberalization. 
Lastly, similar to reforms in education policy, the mentioned reforms contributes to a 
systematic process of risk downloading. Free credit, devolved governance, and 
discontinued subsidies amounts to an increasingly insecure housing market, making 
coherent, long-term planning difficult. Further, deregulation – especially of social 
elements in the housing sector – makes it both politically and economically difficult for 
municipalities to conduct an active housing policy. As such, it fosters interurban 
competition that, in essence, incentives private as well as public actors to ’spoil’ the 
affluent and ’spurn’ the rest.  25
 From 1991 to 2000, Sweden’s gini-coefficient went from 0,226 to 0,294 (SCB, 2016). Meanwhile, the 24
richest ten percent of the population enjoyed a real income increase of 47% (66% for the richest 5%) 
whereas median real income increased only by 5% and the poorest 5% saw their income drop by five 
percent (Hedin et al., 2010:446; Clark:156-157).
 For an elaborated discussion on this topic, see Lind et al. 2016:129-132)25
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5. Malmö – three stages of development  
5.1. The rise of industrial Malmö 
Post-war Malmö was a rapidly growing city, both in terms of population and economy. 
An extensive manufacturing industry occupied a majority of the cities work force 
through blue-collar jobs in the manifold factories, concentrated in the western part of 
the city (Dannestam, 2010:113-114; Mukthar-Landgren, 2005:120-125). 
5.1.1. Modernism and motorism 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Malmö’s material conformation was subject to a regime of 
industrialists, local public representatives and financial institutes, personified by a small 
group of very influential men (as it where). This collaboration between executive-, 
political- and financial powers amounted to an effective construction machine which 
spread its urban fabric of standardized buildings and hefty traffic solutions, across the 
west and southwest parts of Malmö (Billing & Stigendal, 1994:292-293). 
In this way, the automobile was built into the physical environment through a grid of 
wide streets which covered large parts of the city, especially the new built areas.  26
Further, motorism manifested itself in the construction of shopping centres in central 
Malmö. In 1967, an initiative to sanitize the Caroli quarters was initiated. Previous 
settlements were bulldozed in favor of Caroli City: a warehouse with an adjacent 
parking garage. The areas Lugnet, Öster, and Möllevången underwent similar changes 
as 6000 apartments were demolished to make room for roads and new buildings in the 
1960s and 1970s (Billing & Stigendal, 1994:290, 294-295). 
5.1.2. The new districts 
Under this paradigm, the newer parts of Rosengård were constructed (Hallin et al, 
2010:28). The building process was swift and industrial, and the dwellings were 
modern, spacious and – according to many tenants – unnecessarily extravagant (Billing 
& Stigendal, 1994:294). The residential quarters contained no working places, and 
rather than ground floor shops and -boutiques, all local service was gathered in the 
 In 1963, Malmö, out of all major cities in Sweden, had the highest amount of road surface per 26
inhabitant. Meanwhile, the number of car owners increased rapidly. By 1975, half of Malmö’s inhabitants 
owned a car (Billing & Stigendal, 294).
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district centre, situated on top of a intersecting causeway far away from the residential 
areas. (Hallin et al., 2010:29). Fosie and Hyllie was built under similar premises and 
principles, and display analogous material features (Billing & Stigendal, 1994; Hallin et 
al, 2010:27-29) 
5.1.3. Standards and segregation 
The above mentioned development- and redevelopment projects drastically increased 
material housing conditions for a vast quantity of Malmö’s population. However, the 
spatial sprawl which standardization and industrialization of construction and planning 
made possible, amounted to a new urban landscape. A particular feature of which was 
distinct geographical separation of dwelling types, both in terms of size, tenure form, 
local environment and, consequently, life-styles (cf. Molina, 2001:64:69). 
5.2. Suburbanization 
Restructuring carried with it social problems and benefit-dependency which spread in 
the new built neighborhoods, partly because many experienced difficulties in trying to 
adapt to their new, costlier, living environment. Discontent with the situation manifested 
itself in vandalism, petty crime and formation of youth gangs which became perceived 
as a feature of the high-rise areas in particular (Billing & Stigendal, 1994:323). 
Developments contributed to suburbanization during the course of the 1970s.  The 27
vacancies left by the urban out-migrants were filled by immigrants and refugees who 
came to Malmö at increasing pace from the 1970s and onwards (Hallin et al, 
2010:30-31; Dannestam, 2010:114; Billing, 2000:13-17).  
5.3. ”Something of an economic meltdown”  28
During the 1970s and 1980s, Malmö’s stampeding economy waned as the local 
industries suffered economic hardships due to the global restructuring of production. 
Most notably, Kockum’s shipyard  – the crown jewel of industrial Malmö – for 29
 During the 1970s, Malmö lost 30 000 inhabitants to surrounding municipalities (Dannestam, 2010:114)27
 Malmös fiscal situation, as described by the municipality’s president and vice president Illmar Reepalu 28
and Percy Liedholm in a letter to the government in 1995, demanding fiscal support (Billing,  2000:21).
 Kockum is a ship-building company originating from Malmö. During the Post-war-period, the shipyard 29
in Malmö became the greatest in the world. (Billing & Stigendal, 1994:93-94).
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example, was economically restrained and forced to successively phase out operations 
during the 1980s (Billing & Stigendal, 1994). 
5.3.1. Failed interventions 
To hinder surging unemployment numbers, the municipality expanded the public sector 
during 1970s (Billing & Stigendal, 1994:371). Simultaneously, and to the same purpose, 
the municipality actively supported enterprises who where threatened by closure by 
purchasing factory plots. This was the first of a series of public-private partnerships in 
which Malmö used public funds to support private companies. Similar ventures was 
Fosie industry village (Billing & Stigendal, 1994:321-322) and, most notably, the 
subsidized construction of a SAAB factory in 1989 , which was closed two years later, 30
as the company decided to allocate operations to Trollhättan (Dannestam, 2009:117). 
The same year, Fazer, Malmö Strumpfabrik, Pripps and NK – all major employers – 
decided to close down operations in Malmö. The subsequent unemployment hit the blue 
collar workers living in the city’s harder than the more affluent suburbans who 
strengthened their relative position in Malmö’s labour market  (Billing, 2000:13). 31
5.3.2. Austerity measurements 
The entrepreneurial investments, recession and unemployment strained Malmö’s 
economy which was already burdened by the vast public sector (Billing, 2000; 
Dannestam, 2009:127-128). To remedy the city’s deficit, the municipality initiated an 
extensive roll-back and privatization program. The cutbacks had considerable impact on 
social service, especially schools and healthcare.  Nevertheless, fiscal vigilance, in 32
combination with project-based grants from central state and the EU  as well as 33
favorable changes in the municipal redistribution tax, allowed Malmö to make 
investments during the later half of the 1990s which would spur the city’s 
transformation (Mukthar-Landgren:2005:121). 
 This project was a joint venture between central state, the municipality and SAAB (Dannestam, 30
2009:117).
 Of the 27 000 jobs that were lost, 86 percent were held by those living in the city (Billing, 2000:13). 31
 During a three year period, the public sector’s personnel decreased by 6000.  In 1994, schools budget 32
per pupil was 14% lover compared to the rest of Sweden. And in 1996, 18 percent of publicly financed 
ventures were under private regime in Malmö. (Billing, 2000:27-28) 
 Under the supranational cooperation, Sweden became part the European cohesion policy. This was a 33
massive redistributive program. However, it was only concerned with divergence between regions, not 
between people within regions (Stigendal, 2007:45-46).
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5.4. The rise of post-industrial Malmö 
In 1995, an extensive program for future development, vision 2000, was initiated. The 
explicit goal was to make Malmö an attractive city for visitors and companies, 
especially in progressing sectors such as IT and telecommunication. This was to be done 
by transforming Malmö from an industrial city to a knowledge city (Dannerstam, 
2009:127; Mukthar-Landgren, 2005:121). 
The work of vision amounted to a Comprehensive Plan (översiktsplan) (Malmö, 
2001:1-4, 18-20), which concluded that conditions of globalization demanded that 
Malmö strengthened its economic base, that growth should be concentrated to the 
private sector and that this would require a rapid increase in educational levels as well 
as high-skilled immigration. 
5.4.1. A knowledge economy in the ’Öresund region’ 
Öresundsbron, constructed in 1995, allowed foreign companies, mostly Danish, to 
establish themselves in Malmö. To enforce this effect, a public business office was 
established in 1998 which was given the task to foster a good business climate in 
Malmö. This scheme proved successful, as business establishments and population 
continuously increased in number throughout the late 1990s (Stigendal, 2012:40-41). 
In 1997, Malmö Högskola was established. During the course of the 20th century, 
higher education had been foreign to Malmö’s population which was distinctly blue-
collar in its social character. Now however, a rising number of students and the presence 
of the university campus, situated in the western part of Malmö, constitutes a 
materialistic reminder and symbol of the city’s metamorphosis (Billing, 2000:38-39; 
Stigendal, 2012:32, cf. Dannestam, 2009).  
5.4.2. Urban renewal 
A renewal project was initiated in Västra hamnområdet, as part of the European 
housing expo in 2001. The former industrial harbour was turned into a luxurious seaside 
residential area and business centre, which’s most notable component is the skyscraper 
Turning Torso (Holgeresen, 2014a:32-35;2014b). 
Another elite-focused project was the construction of Hyllie, initiated in 2007. The 
extensive urban development program consists of a shopping center (one of the biggest 
in Scandinavia), an events-hall, a 400 room-hotel, two towers and 7500 dwellings 
(Baeten, 2012). 
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Both Hyllie and Västra hamnen was built on land that used to belong to Malmö 
(bought in the 1960s and 1980s) but was sold to private developers. The construction 
process was technocratic in nature and popular influence was limited.  34
Further, the city center was revitalized through renovation projects in Gamla Väster, 
Lilla torg, Gustav Adolfs torg and Triangeln, creating an over one kilometer long axis 
that accommodates a vide range of restaurants, shopping opportunities, recreational 
activities and cultural diversions (Billing, 2000:55-56; Stigendal, 2012:40-41; cf. 
Malmö town, 2016).  
5.5. ”It’s a thin line between heaven and here”  35
Despite Malmö’s thriving surface appearance, the city’s economic prosperity has not 
been a rising tide that lifts all boats. On the contrary, as shown by Taipo Salonen 
(2012), Malmö’s success story is paralleled by a tale of restructuring and exclusion, 
manifested in the city’s economic disparities which increased by 57 percent during the 
period between 1990 and 2008 (compared to 43 percent on a national level). This 
divergence is highly polarized as the richest tenth of the city’s population has seen there 
incomes increase by 56 percent, whereas the poorest tenth (not including the 6,9 percent 
of the adult population in Malmö who does not have a known income) have experienced 
a decrease of approximately 30 percent. Meanwhile, ”ordinary households”  have seen 36
their incomes increase by 20-30 percent. 
In sociospatial terms, Malmö’s uneven development has materialized in the 
increasing gap between the western and eastern districts. While the former has been 
subject to gentrification and consequently accumulated vast flows of capital through 
investments in the built environment, the latter has struggled with socio-economic 
filtering and poor social conditions.  In consequence, easter Malmö offers a 37
comparatively limited range of services. Traders are deterred by the poor local 
consumer substrate, high rates of criminality (Polisen, 2014:14-16) and the competition 
from western Malmö’s prosperous ’experience economy’, which attracts customers 
from the entire city and surrounding municipalities (Boverket:2013:6:19-22; Billing, 
2000:52-60). 
 Complaints were voiced in the local press, more so about Västra hamnen than Hyllie. However, this 34
had little impact on the execution of the projects (Holgersen, 2014a:33-34; Baeten, 2012). 
 Quotation from the character ’Bubbles’ in tv-series The Wire (season 1, episode 4) 35
 Salonens terminology (2012:38), my translation.36
 Filtering refers to a process in which the comparatively affluent systematically leave and are replaced 37
by poorer in-migrants. Gentrification is basically the opposite (Hedin et al. 2010:451-453,458) 
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5.5.1. An exclusive labour market 
When technological and financial institutes came to town, demands on the labour 
market changed as more and more jobs required higher education, and put emphasis on 
technical and ’social competence’ (SOU, 1996:233). Employment opportunities were 
plenty, but the available workforce did not meet the requirements as only a small 
minority of the unemployed in Malmö had gone through higher education (Billing, 
2000:50-55). Many inhabitants also struggled with adapting to the new life-style and 
increased living costs of post-industrial Malmö.  38
5.5.2. Neglected maintenance and slum formation 
In the late 1980s and especially 1990s, several established housing companies – 
impacted by discontinued state support and deregulation – were forced to sell property 
in the marginalized neighborhoods, where operations were no longer profitable (SOU, 
2008:76-77; Blomé, 2012a:96, 98-99). Low prices made way for speculative 
investments, as venture capitalists (out of which many were foreign) acquired a large 
part of the housing stock, especially in Rosengård and Seved (Blomé, 2012a:98-99; 
2012b:198; Hallin et al, 2010). 
Afterwards, maintenance was systematically neglected and mismanaged by investors 
who displayed a limited social commitment, and the capricious nature of the 
investments contributed to frequently reoccurring ownership transfers which has caused 
a great deal of inconvenience for tenants (Blomé 2012b:198-200). Further, lacking 
attendance from landlords has made some buildings a shelter for criminal activity and, 
in turn, vandalism (Edling, 2015:47-49; Rikskriminalpolisen, 2014; Puhakka, 2005) and 
overcrowding (Poopola, 1999; Malmö stad:2012:47, 59). 
To improve conditions, publicly managed MKB bought some of the degraded 
properties in 2006 at great expense for the tax-payers (Blomé, 2012b:198-200). 
5.5.3. Interventions 
With regard to polarization and social programs in the marginalized areas, a series of 
social initiatives were introduced during the 1990s and 2000s (Andersson, et al, 2007; 
Holgersen, 2014b:15-16). The first major intervention was Blommansatsningen, which 
chiefly targeted unemployment among immigrants (Integrationsverket, 2010). In 2004, 
Välfärd för alla followed. This was ”a double commitment” to ensure that all 
inhabitants had access to good living conditions and, at the same time, enforce Malmös 
economy. These goals were, it was argued, entwined because ”with a frail economy 
Malmö cannot provide sufficient welfare for the city’s inhabitants [my 
 Other than expenses related to consumption, housing prices and rent levels in Malmö has increased 38
steadily during the course of the 1990s and the 21st century (Billing, 2000:60; Svensk mäklarstatistik, 
2016)
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translation]” (Malmö, 2004:2). In 2012, Områdesprogrammen was initiated. These had 
similar objectives as Välfärd för alla (Holgersen, 2014b:15-16). 
Evaluations establishes that these ventures have been ill-implemented and that they 
have not effectively addressed the structural dynamic of sociospatial polarization, but 
rather embedded it (Andersson et al. 2007:10; Intergrationsverket, 2000; Skolverket, 
2006b:26-29; Mukthar-Landgren, 2005; Holgersen 2014b17:) 
5.6. The knowledge city? 
Today, one fourth of Malmö’s ninth-graders are not eligible to proceed in the education 
system, a striking statistic which gives the epithet knowledge city a bitter aftertaste. This 
group of children are almost exclusively residing in one of the marginalized areas 
discussed in this essay (Stigendal, 2012:216). Considering the increasingly excluding 
labour market, poor grades points in direction towards a life spent on the side-track of 
western Malmö’s towering development, to which education and private economy are 
keys to participation. 
5.6.1. The educational market 
School segregation has been a feature of education in Malmö since the 1970s. However, 
as a result of increasing immigration, socioeconomic polarisation and cutbacks during 
the 1990s, the situation became more acute as schools in the marginalized areas started 
displaying rapidly dwindling results (SOU, 1996:234; Billing, 2000:28). Meanwhile, 
education providers in Malmö became subject to increasing competition, spurred by the 
free choice reform. Contributing to this development was the rapid growth of free 
schools.  These factors hampered unattractive schools, especially public ones, as the 39
pupil substrate became difficult to predict.  Further, competitive terms between 40
education providers has created a situation in which schools are less inclined towards 
inter-school cooperation (Skolverket, 2012:33-45; Malmberg, et. al. 2013; Bunar, 
2012:35-36).  
5.6.2. ’Cream skimming’ 
Schools in marginalized areas experience both economic and education-related 
difficulties as distinguished pupils, often with advantageous background, show a 
 In 2012, 15 % of all elementary school pupils attended a free school. Almost all of these schools are 39
located in affluent areas western Malmö (Stigendal, 2012).
 Public schools are responsible to provide education to every child in the assigned attendance zone. 40
Thus, they are comparatively sensitive to a volatile substrate (Wiborg, 2010:15, 17)
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tendency of switching to schools in well-to-do areas, a phenomenon referred to as 
’cream skimming’ (Bunar, 2012:36; 2001:8; Malmberg et. al. 2013; Skolverket, 2006a:
4-8). Deprived of high-performing students, disfavored schools are presented with a 
socioeconomically weaker, and ethnically more diverse, pupil-base which, to a higher 
extent, demands special teachers and other particular efforts, straining the schools’ 
budgets and lowering results (Bunar, 2010:  9-10). Schools in well-to-do neighborhoods 
– private schools in specific – on the other hand, produce high grades despite lower 
ratio of staff per pupil, bigger classes and lower management costs. Where it occurs, 
cream skimming is rarely associated with concrete educational aspects in a specific 
school. More often, these processes occur when a school is perceived as an ’immigrant 
school’, which implies alternative social networks, lacking discipline and, overall, poor 
prospects. Such perceptions are often spread through rumors and consequently difficult 
for schools to control (Bunar, 2012:36, 37).  
5.6.3. The agony of choice 
Active school-choice is mostly exercised by the white middle class (Skolverket, 2003). 
Apart from logistic and economical factors, case studies suggests that stigmatization 
and social networks contributes to the underrepresentation of socio-economically 
weaker households and ethnic minorities in ’elite schools’. The prospect of possible 
bullying and unfair treatment from personnel and peers in a new school, deters children 
in marginalized areas from taking advantage of free choice. Further, children are often 
unwilling to move away from their friends and, what they consider a safe and 
recognizable environment (Bunar, 2012:35; Liedman, 2011:16-18). 
5.7. Analysis 
So, firstly, we are faced with the question: has Malmö become a neoliberal city? 
The narrative above contains elements which suggests an entrepreneurial mindset in 
city governance. Direct support to the local industries and reoccurring public–private 
partnerships supports this claim. So does the explicit reorientation from a blue-collar 
labour market to a knowledge city and experience economy (with little regard of the 
populations disposition), which materialized in the construction of Öresundsbron, 
Malmö Högskola and the subsequent urban development programs. 
The latter – to a background of worsening conditions in the eastern parts of Malmö – 
displays tendencies of neoliberal planning.  Seemingly opportunity-led (at least in the 41
 On a side-note, the post-modern urban development programs, in spirit, shows some likeness to the 41
preceding housing projects in so far as they are aimed at ’building away’ social problems by large scale 
development programs with a noticeable element of corporativism and limited regard to popular 
influence. This arguably outlines a contextually specific Swedish neoliberalism with traces of social-
democratic managerialism (cf. Baeten, 2010).
!29
case of Västra hamnen), with a distinct overtone of post-modernism, consumerism and 
sensationalism, these (partly publicly financed) projects produce an impression that the 
local government was actively building a divided city.  Wheatear or not this is true, 42
Malmö’s rhetoric and economic reorientation, the area-based selective interventions 
(especially Välfärd för alla) and these urban development programs, suggests prevail of 
trickle down-economics and social interventionism as the dominant approach to urban 
development. The sociospatial polarisation, and corresponding processes of 
gentrification and filtering adds to the weight of evidence. 
Moving on, Malmö’s educational sector leaves much to be desired in terms of 
integrating children into society. So to the extent, that it can be perceived as a 
mechanism of exclusion. The substantial group of failed students (in which ethnic 
minorities living in the marginalized areas are overrepresented) combined with an 
increasingly sophisticated domestic labour market, privatization and decreased 
education spending in the 1990s and either inadequate, ineffective or lacking 
measurements to adress school segregation, suggests a selective notion of education, 
more similar to competence, in contrast to the post-war ideal. With this in mind, the 
geographically delimited locality of – and socioeconomic heterogeneity in – the (top) 
free-schools, also testifies to neoliberalism’s elite-enforcing mechanisms.   
As for How? Oscillations in Swedish education and housing policy has arguably 
been reflected in the development of Malmö’s political economy and sociospatial 
transformation.  
The massive investments, subsidies and lubricating reforms to construction in the 
1960s and early 70s helped materialize industrial Malmö as a city centered around 
mass-production and collective standardized consumption; a site for fordist-keynsian 
accumulation (Harvey, 1990:125-140). In the 1970s and 80s, devolved responsibilities 
and costs, in combination with economic hardships, induced cutbacks, privatization and, 
in turn, suburbanization. This can be conceived as a roll-back moment, which’s 
corresponding roll-out took place in a de-regulated political landscape that allowed 
Malmö to undergo a metamorphosis and start catering to the ’educated other’ instead of 
its blue collar population. Accordingly, the domestic economy was reoriented from 
manufacturing towards the flourishing sectors of technology and finance. Restructuring 
in combination with the free choice reform and the grading system enforced 
polarization. Meanwhile, as the central stated downloaded social responsibility and 
abolished regulations, investments in the poorest areas collapsed, and the (increasingly 
private) capital was redirected to the upper class districts by means of gentrification and 
post-industrial urban development programs. This resulted in social grievances which, 
in turn, was adressed by unsuccessful interventions that, in words and deeds, 
reproduced the hierarchal order in the domestic economy. 
Instead of being deterred by the failures of ’place politics’, the construction of Hyllie 
suggests that the city has rather raised its stakes in the (interurban) race to the bottom. 
 See Holgersen, 2014b:10-17 for more elaborate discussion on this topic.42
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6. Conclusion 
In this essay, I’ve argued that Swedish education and housing policy has changed from 
coherent social projects to an increasingly contradictory, short-term process of 
neoliberalization with considerable elements of risk downloading. And, that this 
development has coevolved with public private partnerships, neoliberal planning and a 
selective notion of education in Malmö which has underpinned center–periphery 
relations and sociospatial polarization, making Malmö, in essence, a neoliberal city. 
These findings are much in line with earlier research, particularly Holgersen’s 
(2014a) conclusions. 
Personally, I believe that this emphasizes the need to develop a more comprehensive 
and humanizing urbanism; that the best way to adress coercive competition, alienation 
and poor social conditions, is to somehow democratize the production and development 
of cities (cf. Harvey, 2008). Though this is a daunting task, alternatives to exploitational 
urbanism do –  to some extent – exist (see Balfelt, 2016 and Lieberg et al. 2012). As 
such, it seems imperative for critical theory and practice to support and materialize 
these ideas, to challenge neoliberalism’s apparent ecological hegemony and, from its 
contradictions, chart the way to a more inclusive and sustainable development. 
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